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We study two influential voting rules proposed in the 1890s by Phragme´n and Thiele,
which elect a committee or parliament of k candidates which proportionally represents
the voters. Voters provide their preferences by approving an arbitrary number of
candidates. Previous work has proposed proportionality axioms satisfied by Thiele’s
rule (now known as Proportional Approval Voting, PAV) but not by Phragme´n’s
rule. By proposing two new proportionality axioms (laminar proportionality and
priceability) satisfied by Phragme´n but not Thiele, we show that the two rules achieve
two distinct forms of proportional representation. Phragme´n’s rule ensures that all
voters have a similar amount of influence on the committee, and Thiele’s rule ensures
a fair utility distribution.
Thiele’s rule is a welfarist voting rule (one that maximizes a function of voter utili-
ties). We show that no welfarist rule can satisfy our new axioms, and we prove that
no such rule can satisfy the core. Conversely, some welfarist fairness properties cannot
be guaranteed by Phragme´n-type rules. This formalizes the difference between the
two types of proportionality. We then introduce an attractive committee rule which
satisfies a property intermediate between the core and extended justified represen-
tation (EJR). It satisfies laminar proportionality, priceability, and is computable in
polynomial time. We show that our new rule provides a logarithmic approximation to
the core. On the other hand, PAV provides a factor-2 approximation to the core, and
this factor is optimal for rules that are fair in the sense of the Pigou–Dalton principle.
1. Introduction
In the mid-1890s, two Nordic mathematicians were engaged in a somewhat heated academic
exchange about voting. Sweden was soon to introduce universal suffrage, and the conservatives
expected to become a minority and were thus pushing for electoral reform: what was needed
was an election system that would guarantee proportional representation in parliament. Edvard
Phragme´n proposed a voting rule in 1894, and Thorvald N. Thiele responded with an alternative
rule in 1895. They each proved that their rule guarantees proportionality on well-behaved inputs.
Thiele’s rule is simpler to understand, and thus it was popular and soon applied. Phragme´n
thought this was premature, and in 1899 published some examples to show this his rule was
better. Many years later, it is still not clear who came up with the better system.
Both rules are of the same type, and are based on what is now called approval voting : Each
voter i ∈ N gets a ballot listing all m candidates, and is allowed to approve an arbitrary subset Ai
of them. The voting rule then selects a winning committee (or parliament) of k candidates.
1
After the initial papers, rigorous study of the rules was interrupted until a few years ago, when
Thiele’s method was rediscovered—today, it is commonly called Proportional Approval Voting
(PAV)—and there has been intense interest in formalizing the idea of proportional representation.
A one-dimensional hierarchy of axioms has been proposed (with “extended justified representation”
(EJR) being the strongest axiom); PAV does very well on those axioms, and Phragme´n’s rule
perhaps a bit less.
What has not been recognized is that Thiele’s and Phragme´n’s rules achieve proportionality
in two fundamentally distinct senses. These two philosophies cannot be captured by the existing
hierarchy, and are formally incompatible. This paper attempts to clarify the difference. It shows
that the type of proportionality that PAV implements can be viewed as the fair distribution of
welfare, whereas the one implemented by Phragme´n’s rules as the fair distribution of power.
An example
We begin our discussion by considering an example where the two rules behave differently. We
defer formal definitions until later, and only give an intuitive sense of the rules’ behavior. There
are n = 6 voters and m = 15 candidates running for k = 12 seats. The figure below indicates
voters’ approval sets, to be read in columns. For example, voter v1 approves {c1, c2, c3, c4}.
c1
c2
c3
c4 c5 c6
c7
c8
c9
c10
c11
c12
c13
c14
c15
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6
(a) Phragme´n’s rule
c1
c2
c3
c4 c5 c6
c7
c8
c9
c10
c11
c12
c13
c14
c15
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6
(b) Thiele’s rule (PAV)
The committees selected by the two rules are shaded in blue. Which is the better choice?
Phragme´n’s rule looks at the given profile and treats voters v1, v2, v3 as a group, since their
approved candidates are disjoint from others’. Since these voters form half the electorate, they
get to decide half of the available seats, so all six candidates are elected. The rule treats the
remaining voters as singleton groups, and thus assigns them each a sixth of the available seats.
We will later formalize this behavior in an axiom called laminar proportionality , which encodes a
kind of “procedural” proportionality. The committee (a) can also be justified as an outcome that
results if we assign each voter equal “power”, which we will formalize later using virtual money
that voters can spend to elect candidates; we will say that the committee (a) is priceable. Because
the first three voters approve three common candidates, they can share the cost of electing those
candidates, and still have a sufficient budget to afford c4, c5, and c6.
In comparison, the committee (b) will not result if we give each voter equal power: the first
three and the last three voters have the same overall budget, yet the former group gets only
three candidate, and the latter nine. Thus, (b) is not priceable. From a related point of view,
committee (b) is unstable in a sense borrowed from cooperative game theory: the first half of
the voters can be said to “deserve” to decide six seats, and they might deviate by proposing six
candidates on their own. Thus committee (b) is not in the core.
Why, then, does Thiele’s rule select (b)? The reason is that PAV does not aim for fair dis-
tribution of power, but rather for “welfare proportionality”. Welfare in the committee context
is based on the number of candidates in the committee that the voter approves. Looking at
the welfare vectors induced by (a) and (b), Thiele’s choice seems more compelling according to
several criteria. First, committee (b) is better than (a) according to Kelly’s [1997] proportional
fairness criterion: if we moved from (b) to (a), we would make three voters worse off by 33% and
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make three candidates better off by 25%, which on average is a worsening. Second, committees
(a) and (b) have the same utilitarian welfare (the sum of utilities is 18), but (b) spreads repre-
sentation more equally. Finally, committee (a) violates the Pigou–Dalton principle: by removing
candidate c6 and adding c9, we keep the welfare of all but two voters constant, but have reduced
the inequality between v3 and v4. Since it allows such a transfer of utility, committee (a) seems
anti-egalitarian.
Thus, we see that choice (a) follows the spirit of proportionality very closely, and it splits the
committee seats in proportion to group sizes. Choice (b) places a greater emphasis on welfare,
and aims for fairness in those terms.
Proportionality axioms
Thiele’s method. To decide which k candidates are picked, PAV solves an optimization problem:
it elects a committee W of k candidates maximizing the following quantity:
∑
i∈N
1 +
1
2
+
1
3
+ · · ·+ 1|W ∩Ai| .
Thus, the winning committee W maximizes the sum of voter “satisfaction”, where satisfaction is
an increasing function in the number |W ∩ Ai| of committee members that the voter approves.
Specifically, Thiele noticed that using the harmonic number guarantees that the winning commit-
tee is proportional. By “proportional”, he meant that in situations where each voter approves
exactly the members of a single party, the committee is divided in proportion to party sup-
port. For example, suppose there are k = 100 seats, and 30% of the voters approve candidates
{a1, . . . , a100}, another 30% approve {b1, . . . , b100}, and the remaining 40% approve {c1, . . . , c100}.
Then Thiele’s method elects 30 candidates aj , 30 candidates bj, and 40 candidates cj. In any such
“completely partisan” preference profile, Thiele’s method identifies the proportional solution, and
one can show that the harmonic numbers are the unique choice in satisfaction function with this
property [Brill et al., 2018, Lackner and Skowron, 2018].1
Thiele’s notion of proportionality is weak and only applies to cases where different votes are
disjoint. We would also like to have proportionality guarantees when different approval sets may
intersect. In this general case, defining proportionality is more subtle. Under one intuition, a
“cohesive” group of voters (whose approval sets have a large intersection) should be represented
in proportion to their size. Recent research has formalized this idea using notions like extended
justified representation (EJR) [Aziz et al., 2017], which PAV satisfies. Further, PAV guarantees
that cohesive groups obtain high average satisfaction [Aziz et al., 2017, 2018].
We say that a rule is welfarist if it decides the winning committee only based on welfare
information. Formally, a welfarist rule selects the committees that maximize some function of
the welfare vector (|W ∩ Ai|)i∈N of a committee W , which specifies the number of approved
committee members for each voter. Clearly, PAV is a welfarist rule. Now, it is obvious that
notions like Pareto-optimality or the Pigou–Dalton principle can be captured by welfarist rules.
In contrast, proportionality on first sight requires a look at the internal structure of reported
preferences, if only to identify cohesive groups that need to be represented. But PAV shows that
welfare information is sufficient to give strong proportionality guarantees, such as EJR. Our aim
is to explore the limits of welfarism in capturing various forms of proportionality.
1Thiele only considered profiles where for each party, the fraction of voters supporting it is a multiple of 1/k, thus
avoiding rounding issues. To uniquely characterize harmonic numbers, one needs to also specify what happens
in cases rounding issues arise, for example by specifying that the rule should act according to the D’Hondt
apportionment method.
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Thiele’s method (PAV) Phragme´n’s method Our method
laminar proportional X X
priceable X X
PJR X X X
EJR X X
core with constrained deviations X
core 2-approx. ? O(log k)-approx.
welfarist X
Pareto-optimal X
Pigou–Dalton X
computation NP-complete polynomial time polynomial time
Table 1: The rules we consider and properties that they satisfy.
Phragme´n’s objection. In one possible description of Phragme´n’s rule, imagine that each voter
has a bank account, initially with no money in it. At a common and constant rate, each account
is continuously topped up with money. As soon as there is a candidate c whose approvers have
a combined account balance summing to at least (by continuity, equal to) $1, the candidate c
is elected and removed, and the balance of each approving voter is set to $0. We then con-
tinue. Phragme´n’s rule returns the committee consisting of the first k candidates elected this way.
Phragme´n called the virtual money “voting power”.
In an 1899 article, Phragme´n points out some downsides of PAV. He considers an example
(here slightly adapted to avoid ties) where 3000 voters approve {a, b1, b2, b3, b4} and 1000 voters
approve {a, c1, c2, c3, c4}. There are k = 5 seats to be filled. Intuitively, there are two parties:
B = {b1, b2, b3, b4}, supported by 75% of voters, and C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}, supported by 25%. Voters
are partisan and approve exactly one of the parties, except that there is a consensus candidate
a who is approved by all voters. Phragme´n’s rule elects a committee of the form {a, bi, bj, bk, cl}:
one seat is filled with the consensus candidate, and the remaining 4 seats are filled by party
members in proportion to the party’s support. Intuitively, this is a proportional choice. However,
the PAV score of {a, b1, b2, b3, c1} is 3000 · (1 + 12 + 13 + 14) + 1000 · (1 + 12 ) = 7750, while the PAV
score of {a, b1, b2, b3, b4} is 3000 · (1+ 12 + 13 + 14 + 15) + 1000 · 1 = 7850 > 7750, so the latter is the
committee chosen by PAV.
Phragme´n (1899) argues that PAV’s behavior on the above example is undesirable2, and indeed
the committees returned by his rule in this scenario appear more intuitive. On the other hand,
Phragme´n’s rule fails the the EJR property mentioned above [Brill et al., 2017]. Our aim is to
clarify the differences in the types of proportionality provided by the two rules.
Summary of our main results
Based on Phragme´n’s arguments we identify some general classes of situations in which PAV seems
to fail to provide proportionality. These failures inspire the definition of two new proportionality
2Phragme´n writes: “As we can see, Thiele’s method benefits the larger party at the expense of the smaller one.
This obviously means that, when using Thiele’s method, the smaller party could never come to an agreement
wherein both parties vote for one or more candidates that are not aligned with either party. To me it has
always seemed to be the most important, or in any case one of the most important, requirements to impose on a
proportional election method, that it must not obstruct such agreements between parties. It therefore seems to
me that the mentioned property of Thiele’s method is a very serious flaw.” In a sense, PAV removes incentives
to compromise and rewards partisanship.
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axioms, laminar proportionality and priceability, that illuminate the difference between the two
rules: these axioms are satisfied by Phragme´n’s rule, but failed by Thiele’s rule. We show that
PAV fails these notions because they are intrinsically not welfarist: we prove that no welfarist
rule can satisfy either of our two new axioms.
This technique also helps explain why PAV fails to select committees in the core [Aziz et al.,
2017, Fain et al., 2018a]: A committee is said to be in the core if no coalition of voters blocks
it. Roughly speaking, a coalition of α% of the voters can block a committee if they can find a
selection S of α% · k candidates such that every coalition member has more approved candidates
in S than in the committee. To date, it is unknown whether the core is always non-empty. The
core implies EJR, but all known EJR rules fail the core. We prove that no welfarist rule can
satisfy the core property. Thus, in contrast to extended justified representation, the core is a non-
welfarist property. While it remains an open question whether a core committee always exists,
this result shows a kind of barrier to an existence proof.
On the other hand, we show that PAV provides a multiplicative approximation to the core:
there does not exist a deviation in which all coalition members increase their utility by a factor of
more than 2. Further, we show that every rule that provides a better approximation of the core
property than 2, must fail the Pigou–Dalton principle of transfers, which formalizes a minimal
kind of egalitarianism. Thus, according to our approximation measure, PAV comes closest to
satisfy the core among rules that are fair according to the Pigou–Dalton requirement.
While PAV fails laminar proportionality and priceability, it satisfies EJR. Phragme´n’s rule
fails EJR. Might there be an incompatibility between these axioms? The answer is no, and
we introduce an attractive committee rule (which we give the preliminary name Rule X) which
satisfies all three properties. Further, it is computable in polynomial time, and is the first non-
artificial polynomial-time rule satisfying EJR. In fact, the rule satisfies a strengthened axiom
which is intermediate between the core and EJR. We also show that the rule provides a logarithmic
approximation of the core property; our analysis is tight.
The properties of the studied rules are summarized in Table 1. We complement these results
with an additional discussion provided in the appendix. In Appendix A.1 we discuss yet another
family of profiles that illustrates a difference between particular priceable rules, in particular
between our new method and the Phragme´n’s rule. In Appendix A.2 we provide an additional,
and much more informal, discussion on the difference between the two types of proportionality
offered by PAV and laminar proportional rules.
2. The Model and Definitions of Rules
For each i ∈ N, we write [i] = {1, . . . , i}.
2.1. Elections and preferences
Given a set of candidates C = {c1, . . . , cm} and a set of voters N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, an approval
preference profile (or profile) is a list P = (A1, . . . , An), where Ai ⊆ C is the approval ballot of
the i-th voter, i.e., the set of candidates that voter i finds acceptable. We write N(c) for the
set of voters who approve candidate c. A profile P = (A1, . . . , An) is unanimous if all approval
ballots in P are equal. If P1 and P2 are two profiles, then P1 + P2 is the profile obtained by
concatenating the lists P1 and P2.
An election instance (or instance) is a quadruple (C,N,P, k), where C is a set of candidates, N
is a set of voters, P is a preference profile, and k is the desired size of a committee to be elected.
We will write (P, k) for an instance when C and N are clear; they can usually be deduced from
the profile: N = {i : Ai ∈ P} and C =
⋃
i∈N Ai. We will sometimes write C(P ) for the set of
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candidates on which P is defined. We assume that |C| > k. A committee is a subset W ⊆ C of
the candidates with |W | 6 k. Given a committee W , we say that a committee member c ∈W is
a representative of voter i if c ∈W ∩Ai.
2.2. Election rules
An approval-based committee rule is a function f that, given an instance (P, k), returns a non-
empty set of winning committees, each of size at most k.3 Typically, the output of f will be
singleton, but several committees may be tied. Below, we recall definitions of two prominent
election rules known in the literature, and introduce one additional rule which is new to this
paper.
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV). Given an election instance (C,N,P, k), for each commit-
tee W ⊆ C we define its PAV score as:
scPAV(W ) =
∑
i∈N
scPAV(i,W ), where scPAV(i,W ) = 1 +
1
2
+
1
3
+ · · ·+ 1|W ∩Ai| .
PAV picks committees with the highest score: argmaxW⊆C:|W |6kscPAV(W ).
Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule. Assume the voters continuously earn money with the speed of one
dollar per time unit (the time is continuous). In the first time moment t when there is a
group of voters S who all approve a not-yet-selected candidate c, and who have n/k dollars in
total, the rule adds c to the committee and asks the voters from S to pay the total amount
of n/k for c (that is, the rule resets the balance of each voter from S); the other voters keep
their so-far earned money. The rule stops when k candidates are selected.4
Example 1. Consider the following approval-based profile and let k = 4.
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14 v15
Here, c1 and c2 are approved by the first 12 voters, c3 is approved by the first 10 voters,
and c4 and c5 are approved by the last 10 voters. The way Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule
operates in this profile is depicted in the following figure (in the figure, the area of each
polygon corresponding to a selected candidate equals 15/4).
c1
c4
c2
c5
t v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14 v15
t1
t2
t3
t4
3It is often assumed that a committee rule can only return committees of size exactly k. We allow committees of
size smaller than k for technical reasons: it will make the definition of our new Rule X more natural.
4There exist equivalent definitions of this rule, for example in terms of “voter load”, which are more in the
literature [Brill et al., 2017, Janson, 2016], but less intuitive and less convenient for our purposes.
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Candidate c1 will be selected first in time t1 = 15/4·12, and all 12 voters who approve c1 will
be charged 15/48 dollars for that. The remaining 3 voters are left with the total amount of
3 · 15/48 dollars. At time t2 = t1+∆ such that: 3 · 15/48+10∆ = 15/48, the last 10 voters will
be able to afford to buy candidate c4. The first 12 voters would be able to afford c2 only
at time t1 + 15/48. Since ∆ = 9/32 < 15/48, the next candidate selected will be c4. Voters
v6 . . . v12 will pay 9/32 for c2. Each of the last 3 voters will pay 15/48 + 9/32. After selecting
c4 each of the last 10 voters is left with no money, and each of the first 5 voters has 9/32
dollars left. Next, c2 will be selected in time t3 = t2 + 25/128, and c5 at time t4 = t3 + 81/256.
The selected committee is {c1, c2, c4, c5}.
Rule X. This rule is new to the paper. Each voter i ∈ N has an initial budget of one dollar,
bi(1) = 1; the voters spend their money during the run of the rule, buying candidates they
approve of. Buying a candidate costs p = n/k dollars in total (we call p the price). The rule
starts with an empty committee W = ∅ and adds candidates to W sequentially; let bi(t) be
the amount of money that voter i is left with just before the start of the t-th iteration. In
the t-th step, the rule selects the candidate that should be added to W as follows. For a
value q > 0, we say that a candidate c 6∈W is q-affordable at round t if∑
i∈N(c)
min(q, bi(t)) > p. (1)
Thus, the voters approving c can raise the amount p required to elect c while each paying
at most q. If no candidate c 6∈ W is q-affordable for any q, the rule stops and returns W .
Otherwise, the rule selects a candidate c 6∈ W which is q-affordable for a minimum q, and
adds c to the committee W . Note that by minimality of q, inequality (1) holds with equality.
For each voter i ∈ N(c), we set their budget to bi(t+ 1) = bi(t)−min(q, bi(t)). (So each of
these voters pays either q or their entire remaining budget for c.) For each i /∈ N(c) we set
bi(t+ 1) = bi(t).
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This rule is similar to Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule, except in Rule X we give voters money
up front, and in the Phragme´n’s rule we give it to them continuously.
Example 2. Consider the profile from Example 1. Recall that k = 4. The way Rule
X proceeds given this profile is depicted below. The diagram also illustrates the minimal
values q for which the respective elected candidates are q-affordable.
c1
c2
c3
c4
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14 v15
q(c1)
q(c2)
q(c3)
q(c4)
In the first step, c1 is 15/48-affordable and each of the 12 voters who approve c1 pays 15/48.
In the second step, c2 is 15/48-affordable and again each of the first 12 voters pays 15/48.
Next, c3, c4, and c5 are all 15/40-affordable. If c4 is selected in the third step, then no other
candidates will be affordable, and so Rule X selects the committee {c1, c2, c4}. For the
5Since for each selected committee member the voters pay n/k dollars in total, the rule picks at most k candidates.
The rule may select strictly fewer than k candidates. If desired, the committee can then be completed using
different strategies. Most of the crucial properties of Rule X (e.g., EJR and laminar proportionality) do not
depend on the particular strategy. For priceability, the choice of strategy matters.
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sake of this example, assume that c3 is selected in the third step. Then, in the fourth step
each of the first 10 voters is left with no money, voters v11 and v12 have 18/48 dollars left,
and the last 3 voters have 1 dollar each. Thus, both c4 and c5 are 1-affordable, and one
of them (say c4) is selected. Then no candidate is affordable. The selected committee is
{c1, c2, c3, c4}.
It is clear that Phragme´n’s rule and Rule X can be calculated in polynomial time.6 On the
other hand, PAV is NP-hard to evaluate [Aziz et al., 2015].
2.3. Welfarist rules
We are particularly interested in a class of rules that maximize an objective function based on
voters’ utilities. We call such rules welfarist, a concept from welfare economics [Sen, 1979].
Definition 1 (Welfarism). Given a profile P , we define the welfare vector of a committee W as
wP (W ) = (|A1 ∩W |, . . . , |An ∩W |). A committee rule f is welfarist if for each k there exists a
function gk mapping welfare vectors to real values, such that for each instance (P, k) we have:
f(P, k) = argmaxW⊆C:|W |=kgk(wP (W )).
For example, gk could be summation, and then f is the utilitarian rule. If we encode the
leximin principle in gk, we obtain an approval-variant of the rule of Chamberlin and Courant
[1983]. Clearly, PAV is a welfarist rule, and so are all variants of PAV that use scoring vectors
other than harmonic numbers (see, e.g., Lackner and Skowron, 2018). Serial dictatorships can
also be captured.
We say that a welfarist rule is Pareto-optimal if the functions gk are monotonic, and it is easy
to see that the resulting is then Pareto-optimal in the usual sense.
3. Laminar Proportionality
In this section, we define a new axiom called laminar proportionality . This axiom identifies a class
of well-behaved profiles (laminar profiles) and specifies which committees are acceptable outputs
on these profiles. The definition of the axiom is a bit tedious, so we start by giving examples which
will illustrate the ideas. The first example also recalls the graphical representation of profiles that
we will use throughout the paper.
3.1. Examples of laminar profiles
Example 3 (Integral party-list profiles). A profile P = (A1, . . . , An) is a party-list profile if for
all i, j ∈ N , either Ai = Aj or Ai ∩Aj = ∅. Thus, there are r parties C1, . . . , Cr ⊆ C of pairwise
disjoint sets of candidates, and each voter approves exactly the members of one party. Write
n1, . . . , nr for the number of voters supporting each party. We call an election instance (P, k) an
integral party-list instance if P is a party-list profile and the values k · n1/n, . . . , k · nr/n are all
integral. We will also require that |Cz| > k · nz/n for each party z = 1, . . . , r. Figure 1 shows
an example of an integral party-list instance. Each box denotes a candidate, and each voter vi
approves all candidates appearing in the column for vi. In the example, there are three parties,
6For Rule X, to calculate the minimum q that makes a candidate q-affordable, sort the agents N(c) approving
c in increasing order of budget bi(t) remaining. Then for each j = 0, . . . , |N(c)|, check whether we can raise
the required amount p by having the poorest j agents contribute their entire remaining budget, and having the
richest |N(c)| − j agents split the remaining amount equally.
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v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
c1
Figure 1: An integral party-list instance for k = 8. The boxes correspond to the candidates, and
each candidate is approved by the voters below the corresponding box. E.g., candidate
c1 who is represented by the left bottom box is approved by voters v1, v2, and v3.
where v1, v2, v3 support party C1, while v4, v5, v6 support C2, and v7, v8 support C3. Every such
instance is a laminar profile. Our axiom of laminar proportionality will require that a committee
of size k = 8 wins only if it contains three candidates from C1, three candidates from C2, and
two candidates from C3. An example of such a committee is indicated in green.
When introducing PAV, Thiele [1895] discussed exactly the property from Example 3, that is,
proportionality on integral party-list profiles. He showed that PAV satisfies it. Our axiom of lami-
nar proportionality will strengthen this axiom by enlarging the class of profiles on which we specify
the outcome, and PAV will fail this strengthening. Our larger class of laminar profiles keeps the
spirit of ‘integral’ profiles (and sidestep rounding issues), but goes beyond party-lists. Brill et al.
[2018] and Lackner and Skowron [2018] study axioms that apply to party-list profiles without the
integrality requirement (see also Section 4.1), but as we discuss in Appendix A (Remark 1) the
integrality must be required for our larger class of laminar profiles.
Example 4 (Two parties with a common leader). Consider the following instance with k = 4.
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
c8
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6
In this instance, there is one candidate c1 who is approved by all voters. Otherwise, the voters
are partitioned into supporters of two disjoint “parties”, with four voters supporting {c2, c3, c4}
and two voters supporting {c5, c6, c7, c8}. This example is essentially the example discussed in the
introduction. Laminar proportionality requires that a winning committee of size k = 4 includes
c1, and that the remaining three seats are filled in proportion to the party supports: two seats
for {c2, c3, c4} and one seat for {c5, c6, c7, c8}. The figure indicates in green an example of a
committee that is laminar proportional.
Example 5 (Subdivided parties). Consider the following instance with k = 12.
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9
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In this instance, there are two major parties. The left-hand party is supported by two thirds of
the voters (v1, . . . , v6) and thus deserves
2
3 · k = 8 seats. The left-hand party has four candidates
approved by all its supporters, but is otherwise evenly divided into a left wing and a right wing.
Laminar proportionality will require that the four consensus candidates are elected, and that the
remaining 4 seats for the left-hand party be evenly divided among the two wings. There is also
a right-hand party, deserving 13 · k = 4 seats, of which one will go to the consensus candidate of
that party, with the remaining 3 seats divided proportionally between that party’s wings. The
figure indicates in green an example of a laminar proportional committee.
We also give some intuitive explanation of the difference between laminar proportionality and
“welfarist” proportionality in Appendix A.2.
3.2. Definition and properties
Definition 2. An election instance (P, k) is laminar7 if either:
(i) P is unanimous and |C(P )| > k.
(ii) There is a candidate c ∈ C(P ) such that c ∈ Ai for all Ai ∈ P , the profile P−c is not
unanimous, and the instance (P−c, k − 1) with P−c = (A1 \ {c}, . . . , An \ {c}) is laminar.
(iii) There are two laminar instances (P1, k1) and (P2, k2) with C(P1)∩C(P2) = ∅ and |P1|/k1 =
|P2|/k2 such that P = P1 + P2 and k = k1 + k2.
Integral party-list instances (discussed in Example 3) are laminar, since they can be obtained by
forming a disjoint sum (iii) of unanimous profiles (i). Party-list instances that are not integral are
not laminar, since we cannot use operation (iii). Example 4 is laminar, since it can be obtained by
building a party-list instance as before, and then adding the unanimously approved candidate c1
using operation (ii). Example 5 is laminar by applying (iii) to two instances obtained similarly
to Example 4.
Our axiom of laminar proportionality specifies which committees are allowed outcomes on a
laminar instance.
Definition 3. A committee W ⊆ C(P ) is laminar proportional for a laminar instance (P, k) if
|W | = k and
• If P is unanimous, then W ⊆ C(P ).
• If there is a unanimously approved candidate c such that (P−c, k − 1) is laminar, then
W =W ′ ∪ {c} where W ′ is a committee which is laminar proportional for (P−c, k − 1).
• If P is the sum of laminar instances (P1, k1) and (P2, k2), then W =W1 ∪W2 where W1 is
laminar proportional for (P1, k1) and W2 is laminar proportional for (P2, k2).
A committee rule f is laminar proportional if for every laminar instance it returns only laminar
proportional committees.
One can check using a straightforward induction that Phragme´n’s rule satisfies laminar propor-
tionality. The same is true for Rule X. On the other hand, as we have seen in the introduction,
PAV fails laminar proportionality. A detailed proof is given in the appendix.
7The term “laminar” refers to a property of set systems: a family of sets is laminar if any two sets in the family
are either disjoint or one is a subset of the other. For a laminar election instance, the set system {Nc}c∈C ,
where Nc is the set of voters approving c, is laminar (see Proposition 3 in the appendix).
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Theorem 1.
(a) Phragme´n’s rule is laminar proportional.
(b) Rule X is laminar proportional.
(c) PAV fails laminar proportionality.
3.3. No welfarist rule satisfies laminar proportionality
We have seen that PAV fails laminar proportionality. The rules that do satisfy it are not welfarist
rules. We now establish that no welfarist rule can satisfy the axiom. In our proof, we construct
two laminar instances for which the laminar proportional outcomes induce two different welfare
vectors. However, both welfare vectors can be induced by some committee in both instances.
Hence, a welfarist rule cannot choose the laminar proportional outcome in both cases.
Theorem 2. There exists no welfarist committee rule that satisfies laminar proportionality.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that there exists a welfarist rule f which satisfies laminar
proportionality. Let gk be as in Definition 1.
Consider the following laminar instance with k = 20. The two figures show two committees;
the blue one on the left is laminar proportional, while the green one on the right is not.
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
c8
c9
c10
c11
c12
c13
c14
c15
c16
c17
c18
c19
c20
c21
c22
v1
6
v2
6
v3
6
v4
6
v5
6
v6
6
v7
6
v8
6
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
c8
c9
c10
c11
c12
c13
c14
c15
c16
c17
c18
c19
c20
c21
c22
v1
7
v2
7
v3
7
v4
7
v5
5
v6
5
v7
5
v8
5
All committees that are laminar proportional (such as the blue committee) induce the utility
vector w1 = (6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6). The green committee induces w2 = (7, 7, 7, 7, 5, 5, 5, 5). Since f
satisfies laminar proportionality, f selects only committees with welfare vector w1 and none with
vector w2. Thus, by definition of welfarist rules, we have g20(w1) > g20(w2).
Now consider a second laminar instance as follows; again k = 20.
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
c8
c9
c10
c11
c12
c13
c14
c15
c16
c17 c18 c19 c20
c21 c22 c23 c24
v1
6
v2
6
v3
6
v4
6
v5
6
v6
6
v7
6
v8
6
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
c8
c9
c10
c11
c12
c13
c14
c15
c16
c17 c18 c19 c20
c21 c22 c23 c24
v1
7
v2
7
v3
7
v4
7
v5
5
v6
5
v7
5
v8
5
In this instance, the blue committee on the right is the unique laminar proportional committee. It
induces welfare vector w2. The green committee on the left induces w1. Hence, since g20(w1) >
g20(w2), the rule f does not select the blue committee at this instance. Hence, f fails laminar
proportionality, a contradiction.
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4. Price Systems
In this section, we discuss a proportionality axiom we call priceability. We give each voter an
equal budget of virtual money, and let voters spend it on candidates they approve. A committee
is priceable if there is a price such that voter spending can be arranged in such a way that each
committee member gets a total spending of exactly the price, and voters do not have enough
money left to buy additional candidates. The intuition behind this condition is that it encodes
that each voter has (approximately) equal influence on the committee (since each voter starts out
with an equal budget), and this ensures proportionality.
4.1. Definition and properties
Assume that each voter has a budget of one dollar, and that she can use this money to pay for
candidates that she approves of. A price system is a pair ps = (p, {pi}i∈[n]), where p > 0 is a
price, and for each voter i ∈ [n], there is a payment function pi : C → [0, 1] such that
1. If pi(c) > 0, then c ∈ Ai (a voter can only pay for candidates she approves of), and
2.
∑
c∈N pi(c) 6 1 (a voter can spend at most one dollar) .
We say that a price system ps = (p, {pi}i∈[n]) supports a committee W if the following hold:
1. For each elected candidate c ∈ W , the sum of the payments to this candidate equals the
price:
∑
i∈[n] pi(c) = p.
2. No candidate outside of the committee c /∈W gets any payment: ∑i∈[n] pi(c) = 0.
3. There exists no unelected candidate c /∈ W whose supporters, in total, have a remaining
unspent budget of more than p:8
∑
i∈[n] : c∈Ai
(
1−
∑
c′∈W
pi(c
′)
)
6 p.
We say that a committee W is priceable if there exists a price system ps = (p, {pi}i∈[n]) that
supports it. Note that if W is supported by a price system with price p, then p 6 n/|W |, since
the total spending by voters is p · |W | which is at most the total budget n.
We first show that every priceable committee satisfies proportional justified representation
(PJR), an axiom introduced by Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [2017].
Proposition 1. Suppose that W is a priceable committee. Then W provides proportional justified
representation: For every group S ⊆ N of voters such that |⋂i∈S Ai| > ℓ and such that |S| >
ℓ · n/|W |, the committee W contains at least ℓ candidates from ⋃i∈S Ai.
Proof. Suppose W is supported by the price system ps = (p, (pi)i∈N ), and assume for a con-
tradiction that |W ∩ ⋃i∈S Ai| < ℓ. Because voters only spend their money on approved can-
didates, the members of S have together paid the price p for at most ℓ − 1 candidates, so∑
i∈S
∑
c∈C pi(c) 6 (ℓ − 1) · p. Thus, the total amount of unspent budget held by members
of S is
|S| −
∑
i∈S
∑
c∈C
pi(c) > ℓ · n|W | − (ℓ− 1) · p = ℓ · ( n|W | − p) + p > p,
8A strict inequality would be desirable here, but the indivisibilities of the committee setting allow us to only
require a weak inequality.
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where the last inequality follows since p 6 n|W | . In fact, the last inequality must be strict, because
the total spending p · |W | by all voters is strictly less than the total budget n (because the voters
in S have a remaining budget of > p > 0) and hence p < n|W | .
Because |⋂i∈S Ai| > ℓ, there exists a candidate c ∈ ⋂i∈S Ai \W . The supporters of c have
strictly more than p dollars left, contradicting the definition of a price system.
Note that one can check whether a given committee is priceable by solving a simple linear pro-
gram. In contrast, it is coNP-complete to check whether a given committee provides proportional
justified representation [Aziz et al., 2018].
We now show that Phragme´n’s rule always returns a priceable committee. (Thus, a priceable
committee always exists.) The proof follows very naturally from the definition; this leads us to
view priceability as a defining property of “Phragme´n-like” rules, and we note that Rule X is one
of them; a similar proof works for what is known in the literature as “Phragme´n’s optimal rule”.
Proposition 2. Phragme´n’s rule and Rule X always return priceable committees.
Proof. The fact that Rule X returns priceable committees follows directly from its definition. In
the remaining part of the proof we will focus on the Phragme´n’s sequential rule.
First, observe that the definition of priceability does not depend on the initial budget of the
voters. One can always rescale their initial budgets, the price, and their payment functions by
multiplying them by a constant.
Consider an election instance (P, k) and let W be the committee returned by Phragme´n’s
sequential rule for this instance. Assume that the rule stopped at time t (recall that t does not
have to be an integer). Thus, during the execution of the rule each voter earned t dollars in total.
We will now construct a price system that supports W , where the initial budgets of the voters
equals t. We set the price to n/k. For each voter i we construct her payment function as follows;
by default we set the payments pi(c) to 0. Whenever a candidate c is added to the committee
by the rule, and whenever the rule charges voter i for adding c to the winning committee, we set
pi(c) = x, where x is the amount deducted from i. It is clear that each voter spends at most t
dollars, and that each voter pays only for the candidates that she approves of. It also follow
directly from the definition of the rule, that each committee member c ∈ W will receive a total
payment of n/k. Finally for each c′ /∈ W the voters who approve c′ cannot have a remaining
budget of strictly more than n/k dollars in total; otherwise, the rule would have added c′ to the
committee at a time strictly earlier than t.
Recall that Rule X may return committees consisting of fewer than k candidates. By
Proposition 2, this committee is priceable. If desired, one can find a superset of this committee
of size k that is also priceable, for example by filling the remaining seats by running Phragme´n’s
rule with initial budgets equal to those at the end of the execution of Rule X.
Theorem 3. For each party-list profile P , a committee W is priceable if and only if W is selected
by the D’Hondt method of apportionment.
Proof. Consider a party list election instance (P, k) with r parties P1, P2, . . . , Pr; for z ∈ [r] let
nz denote the number of voters supporting party Pz,
∑
z∈[r] nz = n.
The fact that each committee returned by the D’Hondt method of apportionment is sup-
ported by a price system follows because this committee is selected by the Phragme´n’s sequential
rule [Brill et al., 2018, Theorem 3], whose outputs are supported by price systems (Proposition 2).
Now, we prove the other implication. Assume that W is a committee supported by a price
system ps = (p, {pi}i∈[n]), and for the sake of contradiction, assume that W is not a committee
returned by the D’Hondt method of apportionment. This, in particular means that there exist
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two parties, Px and Py, with the number of seats assigned respectively equal kx and ky, such that
nx/kx+1 > ny/ky (see, e.g., Lackner and Skowron, 2018). The total amount of money held by the
voters from Py is equal to ny, and so, the price cannot be higher than ny/ky. The total amount of
unused money, held by the voters from Px is equal to:
nx − kx · p > nx − kx · ny
ky
> nx − kx · nx
kx + 1
=
nx
kx + 1
>
ny
ky
> p.
Thus, an additional candidate from Px can receive the total payment of more than p. This
contradicts the assumption that ps supports W , and completes the proof.
4.2. Priceability does not imply efficiency
Priceability requires only that voters have a similar influence on the outcome. In contrast to other
proportionality axioms, it does not imply any guarantees on utility levels of groups. For example,
laminar proportionality contains an efficiency component in requiring that unanimous candidates
are elected first; this component is missing from priceability. The following example makes this
clear, and also shows that priceability and laminar proportionality are logically incomparable.
Example 6. Fix k, and take k voters and 2k candidates. Voter i approves ci ∪ {ck+1, . . . , ck}.
The instance is shown below. The committee {c1, . . . , ck} (marked blue) is priceable, but clearly,
{ck+1, . . . , c2k} (marked green) is a much better choice (and also priceable).
ck+1
ck+2
· · ·
c2k
c1
v1
c2
v2
c3
v3
· · ·
· · ·
ck
vk
The blue committee in the example is not Pareto-efficient, and is arbitrarily bad in terms of
utilitarian welfare as k → ∞. Given Proposition 1, this example also shows that proportional
justified representation is a weak axiom, and does not rule out bad committees. In contrast,
extended justified representation (which we will further discuss in Section 5.3) forces the efficient
green committee. This is a strong reason to prefer the latter axiom.
4.3. No welfarist rule is priceable
Using a similar technique to Theorem 2, we can show a conflict between welfarism and price-
ability. We show that no Pareto-optimal welfarist rule can satisfy priceability. The additional
assumption of Pareto-optimality seems mild in the context of welfarist rules; we conjecture that
the incompatibility holds even without assuming Pareto-optimality.
Theorem 4. There exists no Pareto-optimal welfarist rule that would always return committees
supported by price systems.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction assume that there exists a Pareto-optimal welfarist rule f
that always returns committees supported by price systems.
Consider Profile 1 depicted in Figure 2. There, we have 12 voters and the committee size is
k = 57; each voter approves at least 57 candidates. Let W ⊆ C with |W | = k be a committee
supported by some price system ps = (p, {pi}i∈[n]).
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Profile 1:
c1
c2
c3
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6
· · ·
v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12
· · ·
Profile 2:
c1
c2
c3
· · ·
· · ·
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12
Figure 2: A diagram illustrating profiles used in the proof that the requirement of being supported
by a price system is incompatible with welfarism (subject to Pareto-optimality). Each
of the first six voters in each of the two profiles approves at least 57 candidates.
We first prove that each of the last 6 voters has at most 5 representatives in W . Assume
towards a contradiction that one of the last 6 voters, say v7, has at least 6 representatives. This
means that p 6 1/6, since no other voter approves candidates approved by v7, and thus v7 must
fully pay for these. Since p 6 1/6, each of the last 6 voters must have at least 5 representatives,
since they otherwise have a remaining budget of strictly more than p. Thus, at least 31 seats are
filled by candidates from A7 ∪ · · · ∪A12, leaving at most 57− 31 = 26 seats for other candidates.
Hence, the total spending of voters v1, . . . , v6 is at most
26
6 . Thus, the average remaining budget
among v1, . . . , v6 is at least
6− 266
6
= 1− 13
18
=
5
18
>
1
6
.
Hence, one of these voters has a remaining budget of strictly more than p, and could afford an
additional representative, a contradiction.
Second, we prove that each of the last 6 voters has at least 4 representatives in the winning
committee. For a contradiction, assume that one voter, say v7, has at most 3 representatives.
This means that p > 1/4. Thus, each of the last 6 voters can have at most 4 representatives
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c1
c2
c3
c4 c5 c6
c7
c8
c9
c10
c11
c12
c13
c14
c15
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6
Figure 3: An election instance with k = 12 in which every core outcome violates the Pigou–Dalton
principle.
in the committee. So there are at most 5 · 4 + 3 = 23 candidates from A7 ∪ · · · ∪ A12 in W .
This leaves 57 − 23 = 34 seats for the remaining candidates, and thus W contains at least 31
candidates from C† = (A1 ∪ · · · ∪A6) \ {c1, . . . , c3}. Thus, one of v1, . . . , v6, say v1 has at least 5
approved candidates in W ∩C†. Since no other voter approves those candidates, we have p 6 1/5,
a contradiction.
Summarizing, each of the last 6 voters has 4 or 5 representatives in W , and so W contains
at least 57 − 30 = 27 candidates from A1 ∪ · · · ∪ A6. Now let W be a committee selected by f .
Since f is Pareto-optimal, W contains candidates c1, c2, and c3. Then W contains at least 24
candidates from C†, and so v1, . . . , v6 have on average at least 7 representatives in W . Let w1 be
the welfare vector corresponding to the winning committee.
Consider Profile 2, which is obtained from Profile 1 by exchanging the roles of the first and the
last 6 voters. By the same reasoning as before, we infer that in the winning committee each of
the first 6 voters has 4 or 5 representatives, that c1, c2, and c3 are selected, and that the last 6
voters have on average at least 7 representatives. Let w2 denote the welfare vector corresponding
to the winning committee in Profile 2.
Observe that both w1 and w2 are achievable in Profile 1 and in Profile 2. Thus, based on the
analysis of Profile 1 we get that f prefers w1 over w2, and based on the analysis of Profile 2 we
get that f prefers w2 over w1, a contradiction.
5. The Core
The main stability notion of cooperative game theory, the core, can be applied to the committee
setting. Consider an election instance (P, k). Based on a definition of Aziz et al. [2017], we say
that a committee W with |W | 6 k is in the core if there does not exist a group of voters S ⊆ N
and a set of candidates T such that |T |k 6
|S|
n and for each voter i ∈ S we have |Ai∩T | > |Ai∩W |.
For example, a committee would be unstable if there existed a coalition of 40% of the voters
who can propose a committee that has 40% of the allowed size such that each coalition member
strictly prefers the smaller committee they proposed. The core implies other axioms such as
extended justified representation (EJR). All known committee rules fail the core, and it is not
known whether it is always non-empty.
5.1. The core is anti-egalitarian
An outcome admits a Pigou–Dalton transfer if we can obtain an alternative outcome where the
utility of all but two individuals remains unchanged, and we have reduced the inequality between
those two individuals: the individual with higher utility was lowered, and the individual with
lower utility was raised (without changing their relative order nor the sum of their utilities).
The Pigou–Dalton principle prescribes that we should only select outcomes that do not admit a
Pigou–Dalton transfer. This is a minimal condition for preferring more equal outcomes.
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Consider the election instance shown in Figure 3 for k = 12, which we previously considered in
the introduction. Any committee W , to be in the core, must contain c1, c2, c3, and at least one
of c4, c5, c6. Otherwise, the coalition {v1, v2, v3} can block W by proposing {c1, . . . , c6}. This
leaves at most k−4 = 8 committee seats to be filled with candidates approved by voters v4, v5, v6.
Hence, in W , there is a voter with utility 4 and a voter with utility 2. Thus, the committee W
admits a Pigou–Dalton transfer: take out c4, c5, or c6, and add a candidate approved by a voter
with utility 2. This example shows that the core is incompatible with the Pigou–Dalton principle.
Any core outcome has avoidable inequality.
The core in the committee election context is sometimes taken to be a group fairness axiom. Our
example suggests that the core is primarily a stability notion rather than a fairness property. The
intuitive reason why the core forces inequality is that the core guarantees higher utility to groups
that are easily pleased: in our example, the coalition {v1, v2, v3} approves three candidates in
common, which allows them to demand higher utility than the other voters who are less cohesive.
It is easy to see that PAV satisfies the Pigou–Dalton principle, and thus it is immediate that
it fails the core. In the next section, we will quantify the incompatibility between Pigou–Dalton
and the core, and we will see that PAV comes as close as possible to satisfying the core, subject
to honoring the Pigou–Dalton principle.
5.2. Approximations to the core
For λ > 1, we say that a committee W is in the λ-core if there does not exist a coalition of
voters S ⊆ N and a set of candidates T such that |T |k 6 |S|n and for each voter i ∈ S we have
|Ai ∩ T | > max(λ · |Ai ∩W |, 1). Lower values of λ correspond to stronger stability guarantees.
For example, for λ = 2, the condition requires that no coalition can deviate in such a way that
each coalition member doubles their utility. In the definition we use max(λ · |Ai ∩W |, 1) instead
of simply λ · |Ai ∩W | for a technical reason. If |Ai ∩W | = 0 then all, even very high, values of λ
impose the same (weak) constraint on the voter’s i satisfaction. Our proof for Rule X (Theorem 7)
depends on the requirement that |Ai ∩ T | > 1 whenever |Ai ∩W | = 0.9 All the remaining results
would hold even if we omitted the “max” operator from the definition.
In the previous section, we saw that no rule that satisfies the Pigou–Dalton principle can be
in the core. By generalizing the example, we can show that any such rule must even fail the
(2− ε)-core for every ε > 0.
Theorem 5. For each ε > 0 there exists no rule that satisfies the Pigou–Dalton principle and
the (2− ε)-core property.
Proof. Let f be a rule that satisfies the (2− ε)-core property for some fixed value of ε > 0.
Consider a profile constructed as follows. Let us fix two positive integers, x and y, with x > y2
and y > 1/ε. First, we have x voters who approve some y common candidates; additionally, each
such a voter approves some y different candidates. Next, we have yx voters, each approving
y candidates, different for each voter. This gives in total m = y + yx + y2x candidates. The
committee size is k = y2x+y. First, we show that, according to the core property, the first group
of x voters should be able to decide about at least y + x(y − 1) candidates. Indeed:
x
n
· k = (y2x+ y) · x
x+ yx
=
y2x+ y
1 + y
=
y2x+ yx− yx− y2 + y2 + y
1 + y
>
y2x+ yx− yx− x+ y2 + y
1 + y
= yx− x+ y = y + (y − 1)x.
9This is mainly the artifact of the fact that Rule X can select less than k candidates. We anticipate that even for
the proof of Theorem 7 we could omit the “max” operator from the definition of the λ-core, if we assumed that
the committee returned by Rule X is enlarged in some specific way.
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Thus, this group of voters can suggest a subset of candidates where each voter has 2y − 1 rep-
resentatives. Since f satisfies the (2 − ε)-core property, we infer that at least one of the first x
voters must have at least y+1 representatives; indeed this is because 2y−1y > 2− ε. Thus, among
the last yx voters there must exists one that has at most y − 1 representatives:
k − y − 1
yx
<
k − y
yx
=
y2x
yx
= y.
This violates the Pigou–Dalton principle.
Since PAV satisfies the Pigou–Dalton principle, Theorem 5 shows that PAV cannot satisfy the
(2 − ε)-core. However, as we now show, it does satisfy the 2-core. Thus, on this measure, PAV
optimally approximates the core subject to Pigou–Dalton.
Theorem 6. PAV satisfies the 2-core property.
Proof. Let W be a committee returned by PAV for some approval profile P . Assume for a
contradiction that there is a group of voters S ⊆ N and a set of candidates T such that:
1. |T | 6 k · |S|n , and
2. For each voter i ∈ S we have |Ai ∩ T | > 2|Ai ∩W |+ 1.
For each candidate c ∈ T \W , we write ∆c for the increase of the PAV score due to adding c
to W . Let us compute the following sum:
∑
c∈T\W ∆c. Consider a voter i ∈ S. Let ri = |Ai∩W |
denote the number of representatives that i has in committee W . Observe that for a candidate
c ∈ T \W who is approved by i, by adding c to W we would increase the PAV score that i assigns
to the committee by 1ri+1 . Further, observe that the number of candidates from T \W that i
approves is at least equal to:
|Ai ∩ T | − |Ai ∩W | > 2|Ai ∩W |+ 1− |Ai ∩W | = |Ai ∩W |+ 1 = ri + 1. (2)
Thus, we get that:
∑
c∈T\S
∆c >
∑
i∈S
(|Ai ∩ T | − |Ai ∩W |) · 1
ri + 1
>
∑
i∈S
(ri + 1) · 1
ri + 1
=
∑
i∈S
1 = |S|.
(3)
Consequently, there exists c ∈ T \W , such that
∆c >
|S|
|T \W | >
|S|
k · |S|n
=
n
k
. (4)
In fact, the above inequality is strict or at least one voter has no representatives in the commit-
tee W . To see that, consider the following two cases. If T ∩W 6= ∅, then |T \W | < k · |S|n , and
(4) becomes a strict inequality. Otherwise, if T ∩W = ∅, then we can observe that the number of
members from T \W who are approved by a voter i is at least equal to the number of members
from T , approved by a voter i:
|Ai ∩ T | > 2|Ai ∩W |+ 1 = 2ri + 1.
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If ri 6= 0 for at least one voter from S, then |Ai ∩ T | > ri+1, and so, when deriving (3) we could
use (2) as a strict inequality, getting (3) as a strict inequality. If ri = 0, then, by definition, i has
no representatives in the elected committee.
In any case, we have that ∆c > n/k, or that ∆c > n/k and Ai ∩W = ∅ for some i ∈ S.
On the other hand, for c ∈ W let δc denote the decrease of the PAV score due to removing c
from W . For each voter i ∈ N the score that i assigns to W will decrease for exactly ri members
of W . Each time, the decrease will be equal to 1ri . Thus, we have that:∑
c∈W
δc =
∑
i : ri>0
ri · 1
ri
=
∑
i : ri>0
1 6 n.
Further, if Ai ∩ S = ∅ for at least one voter, then the above inequality is strict. Consequently,
there exists a candidate c′ whose removal would decrease the PAV score of W by at most n/k (or
by strictly less than n/k if Ai ∩W = ∅ for some i ∈ S).
Thus, by replacing c′ with c in W we would obtain a committee with a higher PAV score
than W , a contradiction.
We can also show that Rule X approximates the core, although only to a logarithmic factor.
The proof is in the appendix.
Theorem 7. Rule X satisfies the O (log k)-core property, but fails the O (logc k)-core property for
each c < 1.
Other approximate core notions. Other authors have considered alternative notions of approx-
imate core outcomes. Fain et al. [2018b] consider an approximate core notion that uses both
multiplicative and additive factors. They show that a rule based on dependent rounding of a
fractional committee can approximate the core in their sense. For each λ ∈ (1, 2] they show that
there exists a committee such that for no coalition S and set T with |T | 6 k · (2−λ) · |S|n we have
|Ai ∩ T | > λ · |Ai ∩W |+ η for all i ∈ S, where η is a constant depending only on λ and k. Note
the extra factor (2−λ) in the upper bound for |T |. This notion of approximation is incomparable
to ours (for λ = 2 it is weaker). Cheng et al. [2019] show that under PAV, it can occur that
coalitions can deviate using a set T that is much smaller than the limit k · |S|n imposed by the core;
they show that there can be successful deviations with |T | = O(β · |S|n ) where β =
√
k. Jiang et al.
[2019] show that for β = 32 there always exists an outcome where the deviation is not possible.
5.3. The core with constrained deviations
In Theorem 7, we saw that Rule X only provides a logarithmic approximation to the core. In
comparison to PAV, this may sound like bad news. However, the lower bound example for
Theorem 7 (in the appendix) has an interesting structure: the blocking coalitions in the example
profile are very unequal. While some coalition members are extremely satisfied by the blocking
proposal, others are barely better off. In this section, we show that whenever Rule X fails the
core, the output committee can only be blocked by proposals that are “unfair” to members of the
blocking coalition. In practice, it will be difficult to form such coalitions since they face internal
instability. This is a similar principle as the bargaining set from cooperative game theory.
We begin by defining a general notion of the core with constraints on the allowed deviations.
This yields a way of studying relaxations to the core different from the quantitative approximation
notions discussed in the previous section.
A property of committees P is a set of pairs ((P, k),W ) where (P, k) is an election instance and
W is a committee. For example, priceability is a property of committees.
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Definition 4. Let P be a property of committees. Given an instance (P, k) and a committee W ,
we say that a pair (S, T ), with S ⊆ N(P ) and T ⊆ C(P ) is an allowed deviation from W if
(i) |T | 6 k · |S|/n,
(ii) for each i ∈ S we have that |Ai ∩ T | > |Ai ∩W |, and
(iii) T has property P in the instance (P |S , |T |) obtained by restricting P to the voters in S.
We say that a committee rule f satisfies the core subject to P if for each profile P and each
winning committee W ∈ f(P ) there exists no allowed deviation.
Consider the property Pcoh called cohesiveness, where ((P, k), T ) ∈ Pcoh if every voter in P
approves all candidates in T . It is easy to see that a rule f satisfies the core subject to Pcoh if
and only if f satisfies extended justified representation (EJR) [Aziz et al., 2017]. A committee W
satisfies EJR if for every group of voters S ⊆ N with |S| > ℓ · n/k and |⋂i∈S Ai| > ℓ, there exists
some i ∈ S such that |W ∩Ai| > ℓ.
Theorem 8. Rule X satisfies EJR.
Proof. Let W be a committee picked by Rule X for an approval profile A. Recall that p = n/k
is the price used in the definition of Rule X. Consider an ℓ-cohesive group of voters S and, for
the sake of contradiction, assume that for each i ∈ S we have |Ai ∩ W | 6 ℓ − 1. When the
rule stopped, some voter i ∈ S must have been left with a budget of less than p/|S|. Indeed,
otherwise there would exist a candidate c /∈ W approved by all the voters from S who would be
p/|S|-affordable, and thus Rule X would not have stopped and instead picked c. Since i has at
most ℓ− 1 representatives in the committee, for some committee member i must have paid more
than:
1− p|S|
ℓ− 1 >
1− 1ℓ
ℓ− 1 =
1
ℓ
.
Let us consider the first committee member c′ that has been picked by the rule such that some
voter from S paid more than 1/ℓ for c′ (by the above reasoning such a candidate exists). Thus, c′
is not 1/ℓ-affordable. At that moment each voter i ∈ S had at most ℓ− 1 representatives, and for
each of them paid at most 1/ℓ. Thus, each such a voter would have at least the following budget
left:
1− (ℓ− 1) · 1
ℓ
= 1− 1 + 1
ℓ
=
1
ℓ
.
Further, |S| · 1/ℓ > p. Thus, there is a candidate c′′ who is approved by all the voters from S
and which is 1/ℓ-affordable. This contradicts that Rule X chose candidate c′ and completes the
proof.
Note that Phragme´n’s rule fails EJR [Brill et al., 2017], while PAV satisfies it [Aziz et al., 2017].
Because PAV is NP-hard to compute, Aziz et al. [2018] looked for polynomial-time computable
rules satisfying EJR, and found a class of rather artificial rules doing so. Rule X is arguably the
most natural polynomial-time computable committee rule satisfying EJR known to date.
We have argued above that Definition 4 is particularly well motivated when P is itself a fairness
property. Theorem 9 below shows that Rule X satisfies the core subject to Pprice-eq, where Pprice-eq
is is a strengthening of the priceability requirement: We say that ((P, k), T ) ∈ Pprice-eq if there
exists a family of payment functions {pi}i∈N(P ) with
(i)
∑
c∈T pi(c) 6 1 for each i ∈ S,
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(ii)
∑
i∈N pi(c) = n/k for each c ∈ T , and
(iii) for each i, j ∈ N(c) we have pi(c) = pj(c).
We call the property Pprice-eq priceability with equal payments. Note that this property is weaker
than cohesiveness (thus, in particular Theorem 9 implies Theorem 8). In fact, it is even weaker
than laminar proportionality. It implements an intuitive idea of fairness, which says that different
voters should all pay the same amount to elect an approved candidate to the committee. Notably,
one can check that in the example discussed in the introduction, PAV admits a core deviation
that is priceable with equal payments, so Rule X outperforms PAV on this measure.
Theorem 9. Rule X satisfies the core subject to Pprice-eq.
Proof. Towards a contradiction assume that there exists a profile P , a committee W returned by
Rule X for P , and an allowed deviation by coalition S ⊆ N to T ⊆ C.
Consider a price system ps that witnesses that T satisfies Pprice-eq for the profile P |S . For each
candidate c ∈ T by φc we denote the payment that each voter pays for c in ps. Let Wt be the
set of candidates selected by Rule X up to the t-th iteration. We will first prove the following
invariant: For each t, in the t-th iteration Rule X selects a candidate for which each voter pays
at most minc∈T\Wt φc. For the sake of contradiction assume this is not the case and let t be
the first iteration in which Rule X selects a candidate ct for which some voter pays more than
minc∈T\Wt φc. Let c
′
t = argminc∈T\Wtφc. We will argue that Rule X would rather select c
′
t than
ct.
Indeed, up to the t-th iteration each voter has fewer representatives in Wt than in T (since
T is a core deviation). Further, up to the t-th iteration each voter pays on average less for her
representatives inWt than in T (this is because t is the first iteration where the candidate selected
by Rule X costs the voter more than each not-yet selected candidate from T ). Thus, each voter
who pays for c′t in ps has still some money left to pay for c
′
t (since they had money to pay for c
′
t in
ps). Since Rule X always selects a candidate who is affordable and who minimizes the per-voter
payment, it would rather select c′t than ct, a contradiction; this proves our invariant.
However, by a very similar reasoning we can reach a contradiction. Indeed, by our invariant
each voter pays for her representatives in W less than it would pay for her representatives in T
according to ps. Each voter form S has fewer representatives, and thus they would have money
to buy some not-yet selected candidate from T . This gives a contradiction and completes the
proof.
In Proposition 4 in the appendix, we show that Rule X does not satisfy the core when we
further relax the constraint to allow any deviations that are priceable, without requiring equal
payments.
5.4. No welfarist rule satisfies the core
Just like for laminar proportionality and priceability, we can prove that no welfarist rule can
satisfy the core (in its full strength). The construction is significantly more involved than the
previous arguments of this type. We see this result as a kind of obstruction to proving that the
core is non-empty for all profiles, since we rule out the large class of welfarist rules as possible
candidates.
Theorem 10. There exists no welfarist committee rule that satisfies core.
Proof. Assume that there exists a welfarist committee rule f that satisfies core.
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Profile 1:
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14 v15 v16
c1 c2 c3 c4
c11
c5
c6
c7
c8
c9
c10
Profile 2:
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14 v15 v16
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
c8
c9
c10
c11
c12
c13
Profile 3:
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v16. . .
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
c1
c2
c3
c7
c8
c9
c13
Figure 4: A diagram illustrating the reasoning in Theorem 10, showing that there exists no wel-
farist rule that satisfies the core property. Here each rectangle denotes a single candidate
who is approved by the respective voters. For example, in Profile 1 candidates c5 and
c6 are approved by {v1, v2, v3, v4} and c11 is approved by {v5, v6}. Profile 2 depicts the
case for x = 3 and y = 6. Profile 3 depicts the case for x = 2 and y = 5.
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Consider Profile 1 from Figure 4 with 16 voters and 52 candidates, and let k = 48. To this
profile we add two candidates who are not approved by any voter, getting 54 candidates in
total. The group of three voters {v1, v2, v3} deserves to decide about 48 · 3/16 = 9 committee
members. Since this group approves candidates {c1, c2, c3, c5, . . . , c10}, by the core property we
get that c5, c6, . . . , c10, and at least one of the candidates c1, c2, c3 must be members of the winning
committee. Without loss of generality, assume that c1 is picked by f . By the same reasoning,
applied to {v2, v3, v4} we infer that at least one of the candidates c2, c3, c4 must be included in
the winning committee. Assume c2 is picked. Thus, in the winning committee: some x voters
(x ∈ {2, 3, 4}) have 7 representatives each. In the remaining part of the proof we will assume that
x = 3, and that the voters who have 7 representatives are v1, v2 and v3. The reasoning when x is
even is simpler, and we will shortly discuss it at the end of the proof.
By looking at {v5, v6} (and again applying the core property) we get that either: (i) both voters
have 6 representatives (this happens when the rule picks all 7 candidates approved by v5 and v6),
(ii) one of the voters has 6 representatives and the other one has 5 (this is obtained by picking
6 candidates out of the seven approved by v5 and v6), (iii) both voters have 5 representatives
(picking 5 or 6 candidates out of the seven approved by v5 and v6). Summing up, we get that the
winning committee must consist of candidates c5, c6, . . . , c10, candidates c1, c2, c3, and for each
pair of voters {v2i−1, v2i} with 3 6 i 6 8, the committee must have at least 5 candidates approved
by these two voters. This gives in total 39 candidates, and leaves 9 free seats in the committee.
Thus, at least 12 − 9 = 3 candidates who are approved by voters v5, v8, . . . , v16 are not in the
winning committee. Finally, only 54 − 48 = 6 candidates do not get in to the committee. Since
we assumed x = 3, one of the candidates that do not get in to the committee is c4. As a result,
at least two voters from v5, v6, . . . , v16 will have 6 representatives.
Consequently, in the winning committee: 3 voters have 7 representatives each, some y voters
(3 6 y 6 10) have 5 representatives each; the remaining voters (at least 2 from v5, v6, . . . , v16 and
v4) have 6 representatives. Let w1 be a welfare vector corresponding to the winning committee.
Further, without loss of generality assume that in the winning committee v15 and v16 have 6
representatives, each.
Now, consider Profile 2 from Figure 4. In this profile the voters are grouped in pairs. Voters v1
and v2 approve some 7 candidates; voters v3 and v4 approve some 6 candidates. The pairs (v5, v6)
and (v7, v8) approve some 6 candidates (different for each pair); we add one additional candidate,
who is approved by v6 and v7. The next four pairs approve some 6 candidates (different for
each pair). Additionally, the first voter in the last pair (voter v15) approves one more different
candidate. Finally, there are three candidates who are not approved by any voter—we call them
dummy candidates.
Consider the committee (for Profile 2) assembled in the following way: we take the 7 candidates
approved by the first pair, 5 candidates approved by the second pair, 6 candidates approved by
(v5, v6), 5 candidates approved by (v7, v8), and the candidate approved by (v6, v7). This already
gives us: 3 voters with 7 representatives, 3 voters with 5 representatives and 2 voters with
6 representatives. Further, for each of the next three pairs we take either: (i) 5 candidates
approved by both the voters in the pair and one dummy candidate (getting two voters with 5
representatives, each), or (ii) 6 candidates approved by both the voters in the pair (getting two
voters with 6 representatives, each). Finally, for the last pair, we take either: (i) 5 candidates
approved by both the voters in the pair and the one approved by v15 (getting one voter with
5 representatives and one with 6), or (ii) 6 candidates approved by both the voters in the pair
(getting two voters with 6 representatives, each). By this procedure, it is possible to assemble a
committee with 3 sevens, y fives, and sixes in the remaining (at least three) positions (one can see
that the last pair is constructed differently so that we can assemble such a committee for every
parity of y). This committee (for x = 3, y = 6) is marked with a color in the picture.
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By taking the appropriate permutation σ of the voters in Profile 2 we can make this welfare
vector match w1. This shows that the welfare vector w1 is achievable in (permuted) Profile
2. Specifically, we will use the permutation which satisfies the following properties. It matches
voters v5, v8, and v16 from Profile 2 to some voters from v5, v6, . . . , v16 in Profile 1—this is possible
since in Profile 1 there is a sufficient number of voters who have 6 representatives among those
from v5, v6, . . . , v16 (to match v5 and v16, if v16 has 6 representatives), and there is a sufficient
number of voters who have 5 representatives among those from v5, v6, . . . , v16 (to match v8 and
v16, if v16 has 5 representatives). Further either v5 and v16 or v8 and v16 should be matched to
two voters from the same pair in Profile 1 (this is possible for the following reason: If v16 has
5 representatives, then these two pairs, (v5, v16), and (v8, v16) have, respectively (6, 5) and (5, 5)
representatives. At least one pair in Profile 1 has (5, 6), (6, 5), or (5, 5) representatives—this is
because at least one voter among the last 12 in Profile 1 has 5 representatives and at least two
have 6—-so the matching is possible. If v16 has 6 representatives, the reasoning is similar: the two
pairs, (v5, v16), and (v8, v16) have, respectively (6, 6) and (5, 6) representatives, and at least one
pair in Profile 1 has (5, 6), (6, 5), or (6, 6) representatives). Further, the permutation matches v6
with v3, and v15 with v4 (note that v15 in our assembled committee has always 6 representatives).
Finally, the permutation matches the first 2 voters in Profile 1 with the same voters in Profile 2.
Yet, from the core property it follows that the winning committee in Profile 2 must give a
different welfare vector. Such a committee needs to have one of the following forms. The first
four voters get at least 6 representatives. The numbers of the representatives that the next four
voters get (voters v5, v6, v7 and v8) can be either, (5, 6, 6, 5), (6, 6, 6, 6), (6, 7, 6, 5), or (5, 6, 7, 6).
Each voter from the next three pairs gets 6 representatives. The two voters in the last pair get
either 6 representatives each, or v15 gets 6 representatives and v16 gets 5. Finally, if (v5, v6, v7, v8)
gets (5, 6, 6, 5) representatives, then there is one free slot in the committee which can be used for
a dummy candidate, for a candidate approved by the first pair, or by someone approved by a
voter in the last pair.
One can check that (with permutation σ) this welfare vector, call it w2 is achievable in Profile
1. For this, we need to observe that this welfare vector has at most 3 fives (and if there are exactly
3 fives, then two of them correspond to the voters matched to a single pair in Profile 1). In Profile
1 we can first take candidates c5, . . . , c10, and for each pair of voters {v2i−1, v2i} with 3 6 i 6 8
we can take the seven candidates approved by these voters. This gives a vector with all sixes.
Now, we can remove at most two candidates to match the “fives” in the welfare vector (this is
possible by removing only two candidates since two voters among those corresponding to fives are
matched to a single pair in Profile 1), and add dummy candidates or candidates from c1, . . . , c4 to
match the “sevens” (this is also possible since the voters who can have seven representatives—the
voters in the first pair, v6, and v15 are matched to the voters from v1, . . . , v4 in Profile 1).
This vector is different from w1 since it has 7 in at most two positions.
In Profile 1 f prefers w1 over w2, while in the permuted Profile 2 the other way around. This
gives a contradiction and completes the proof for the case of x = 3.
If x is even, then instead of Profile 2 we use Profile 3 from Figure 4. The proof follows from
a similar reasoning, which now is much simpler since we do not need to deal with the candidate
commonly accepted by v6 and v7.
6. Conclusion
Through a detailed axiomatic study, we have obtained a clearer picture of the way that
Phragme´n’s voting rule provides proportional representation. We have seen that these proportion-
ality properties cannot be achieved by welfarist rules such as PAV. Conversely, proportionality in
the sense of Phragme´n’s rule is incompatible with the basic fairness condition of the Pigou–Dalton
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principle. We say that PAV gives an optimal approximation to the core, subject to that princi-
ple. Finally, we have introduced an elegant new voting rule that combines the proportionality
properties of Phragme´n’s rule while also satisfying EJR.
Our study distinguishes two conceptually different types of fairness/proportionality. We see
axioms that describe fairness with respect to the distribution of welfare (take as examples the
Pigou–Dalton principle, proportionality degree [Skowron, 2018], or extended justified representa-
tion) or with respect to the distribution of power (e.g., priceability, and laminar proportionality).
This dichotomy of axioms is reflected in a dichotomy of voting rules: PAV is a welfarist rule that
ensures a fair distribution of voter satisfaction, whereas Phragme´n’s rule and Rule X primarily
aim at achieving a fair distribution of voting power. One can observe a similar dichotomy in
other areas of voting theory: Condorcet’s criterion implies an equal distribution of voting power,
while Borda’s rule is welfarist and may overrule a majority.10 When viewed from this perspective,
the dispute between Thiele and Phragme´n looks more similar to the one between Borda and
Condorcet than it might at first appear.
Parts of our discussion has been relegated to the appendix. In particular, in Appendix A.1
we highlight a few differences between our new method and the Phragme´n’s voting rule, and in
Appendix A.2 we provide an additional informal discussion on the two types of proportionality
offered by PAV and priceable rules.
Several important and technically interesting questions remain. Known priceable rules (such as
Phragme´n’s rule) fail Pareto-optimality, and the natural way to achieve Pareto-optimality (some
form of welfare maximization) cannot guarantee priceability. Does there always exist a Pareto-
optimal and priceable committee? Is there a natural voting rule satisfying both properties? We
believe that a detailed analysis of the class of priceable rules is an interesting direction for further
research. Further, we have seen that no welfarist rule satisfies the core. Can one show that no
welfarist rule approximates the core to a better factor than PAV? We say that Rule X satisfies
the core if we only allow deviations that treat members of the deviating coalition fairly. Is it
possible to prove the existence of the core with weaker constraints than the ones we identified
(e.g., priceability without the requirement of equal payments)?
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A. Additional Discussion
This section provides some additional explanations that have been omitted from the main text.
The following remark justifies certain decisions that we made when formalizing the concept of
laminar proportionality—in particular it explains our focus on integral profiles.
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Remark 1. One could strengthen a part of the definition of laminar proportionality as follows:
If there are two instances (P1, k1) and (P2, k2), not necessarily laminar, with C(P1) ∩ C(P2) = ∅
and |P1|/k1 = |P2|/k2, then for the instance (P1+P2, k1+k2), we must have f(P, k) = {W1∪W2 :
W1 ∈ f(P1, k1),W2 ∈ f(P2, k2)}. This condition is failed by many laminar proportional rules.
Consider the instance (P1, k = 2) where 2 voters approve {c1}, 2 voters approve {c2} and 2 voters
approve {c3}; and the instance (P2, k = 4) where 12 voters approve {c4, c5, c6, c7, c8}. In both
instances, Phragme´n’s rule (or any reasonable rule) declares a tie between all feasible committees.
The combined instance (P1 + P2, k = 6) is a party-list profile, and Phragme´n’s rule selects a
committee of form {ci, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8} where ci ∈ {c1, c2, c3}, failing the strengthened condition.
The same is true for any other rule which behaves like D’Hondt’s apportionment method on
party-list profiles. From Theorem 3 it follows that this strengthened condition is incompatible
with priceability.
Proposition 3 below, explains the name “laminar proportionality”.
Proposition 3. Suppose (P, k) is laminar. For each c ∈ C(P ), let Nc = {i ∈ N : c ∈ Ai} be the
set of voters approving c. Then the family (Nc)c∈C(P ) is laminar.
Proof. We prove this by induction on k. (i) If P is unanimous, then the sets Nc are all equal.
(ii) Suppose c′ ∈ C(P ) is such that c′ ∈ Ai for all Ai ∈ P , and (P−c′ , k − 1) is laminar. Then by
the inductive hypothesis, the set system (Nc)c∈C(P )\{c′} is laminar. Further, Nc′ = N(P ), and
hence Nc ⊆ Nc′ for all c ∈ C(P ) \ {c′}. Thus, the set system (Nc)c∈C(P ) is laminar, as required.
(iii) Suppose P = P1 + P2 for some laminar (P1, k1) and (P2, k2) on disjoint candidate sets. Let
c1 ∈ C(P1) and c2 ∈ C(P2). Then Nc1 and Nc2 are disjoint. Since (Nc)c∈C(P1) and (Nc)c∈C(P2)
are laminar by the inductive hypothesis, the overall set system (Nc)c∈C(P ) is also laminar.
A.1. Overlapping Parties: Comparing Rule X and Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule
This section highlights some differences between Rule X and Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule. As
we have already noticed, Rule X satisfies EJR and core subject to priceability with equal pay-
ments. On the other hand, the Phragme´n’s rule is committee-monotonic.11 Below, we give an
example of a simple class of profiles (overlapping parties) where the behavior of the two rules
vary significantly.
Consider the following profile:
· · ·
· · ·
50% of voters 25% of voters
(consensus voters)
25% of voters
We have two overlapping parties, marked with two different colors. The first 50% of voters
approve only the first party, the next 25% of voters approve both parties, and the last 25% of
11If we increase the size of the committee from k to k + 1, then the new committee selected by the Phragme´n’s
rule will have the same members as the old committee of size k, and one additional candidate.
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voters approve only the second party. Assume k = 100, and that each party has at least 100
candidates. In this example Rule X would pick 75% of candidates from the first party, and 25%
from the second one.12 Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule, on the other hand, would assign roughly 2/3
seats to the first party and 1/3 seats to the second party (this would be also the outcome of PAV
run for this profile).
Intuitively, the Phragme´n’s rule (and PAV) notices that the consensus voters are satisfied by
any outcome, and implements proportionality with respect to the remaining voters who approve
only one of the two parties. The proportion of these two groups of voters is 50/25 and so this is
also the proportion of the seats assigned to the respective parties by the Phragme´n’s rule (and
PAV). Rule X treats the consensus voters in a different way. It observes that they can be treated
either as supporters of the first party, or as the supporters of the second one. Rule X makes the
choice how to treat these voters based on the utilitarian criterion: indeed, in the above example
the consensus voters are treated as supporters of the larger party, and with this assumption the
solution returned by Rule X is also proportional (and has a higher total support from the voters).
A.2. Proportionality with Respect to Disagreements
In this subsection we give some informal insights on the two types of proportionality, implemented
by priceable rules (here, for the sake of concreteness, we use the example of Rule X) and PAV.
Very informally speaking, in Rule X each voter has a voting power that is equal to the amount of
money she holds. For example, consider two groups of voters, S1 and S2, and assume |S2| = γ|S1|:
then, since group S2 is γ times larger than S1, it initially has γ times more money, and so it has γ
times more voting power. This intuitively explains why Rule X is proportional. Now, assume that
there is a group T of α committee members that the voters from S1 and S2 agree on (either all
members of S1 ∪S2 approve them, or all members disapprove them). Since including a candidate
in a committee costs each voter the same amount of money (apart form the corner cases, when
the voter pays all her left money), the voters from S2 must have paid for the candidates from T
roughly γ times more money than the voters from S1. Thus, the money that the groups S1
and S2 have excluding the money that they paid for candidates from T is still in proportion 1 : λ.
Thus, the relative voting power of the two groups did not change as a result of including in the
committee candidates that the two groups agree on. Intuitively Rule X implements a kind of
proportionality that focuses on how to fairly resolve the conflicts of opinions in a group of voters,
and thus when dividing the seats between two groups of voters (relatively, leaving the remaining
voters aside) it does not consider the candidates that the two groups agree on.
This is different from PAV. For PAV the concept of a voting power of a voter is much harder
to grasp, thus we will rather focus on its sequential variant.13 In this case when a voter already
has r representatives in a committee, her voting power (again, intuitively, and very informally)
equals 1/ri+1. Initially, the voting power of the groups S1 and S2 from the previous example
is in proportions 1 : λ. That is, looking only at these groups alone, if a group S1 deserves x
representatives, none of which is liked by S2, then group S2 deserves λx representatives—this is
because 1/x = λ/(λx). However, including in the committee α candidates that the voters from
S1 ∪ S2 approve changes this ratio of the voting power dramatically. Now, if group S1 deserves
x candidates who are not liked by S2, then S2 deserves roughly y representatives such that
1
x+α =
λ
y+α . Thus, the relative voting power of groups S1 and S2 changes as a result of including
some commonly agreed candidates in the committee. This is because PAV (and its sequential
12Interestingly, this example can also be interpreted as “laminar”. Here the approval sets of the voters form a
laminar family. This is different from the case of laminar profiles, where laminarity is with respect to the family
of sets {Nc}c∈C (see Proposition 3).
13In sequential PAV we start with and empty committee W = ∅ and in each of k consecutive steps we add one
candidate to W . The candidate to be added is the one that increases the PAV score of the committee W most.
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counterpart) implements a type of proportionality that is concerned with the absolute welfare of
the voters rather than the one implemented by Rule X which rather looks at the disagreements
among the voters.
B. Proofs Omitted From the Main Text
Theorem 1.
(a) Phragme´n’s rule is laminar proportional.
(b) Rule X is laminar proportional.
(c) PAV fails laminar proportionality.
Proof. (a) Let us start by providing the proof for the Phragme´n’s sequential rule. We prove,
by induction on k, the stronger statement that on every laminar instance (P, k), Phragme´n’s
sequential rule is laminar proportional, and that it terminates at time t = k/n.
(i) If P is unanimous, then Phragme´n’s sequential rule elects any k candidates in an arbitrary
order, one candidate after each time increment of 1/n, so it terminates at t = k/n.
(ii) Let C∗ = {c ∈ C(P ) : c ∈ ⋂i∈N Ai} be the set of candidates who are approved by every
voter, and suppose that r := |C∗| > 1, and that (P |C\C∗ , k − r) is laminar. Note that in the
profile P |C\C∗ , there does not exist a candidate who is approved by every voter. Start running
Phragme´n’s sequential rule until time t = r/n. At this point, all candidates in C∗ will have
been elected (in some order), and all n voters have spent all their money. Thus, from this point
onward, Phragme´n’s sequential rule behaves exactly as if it was run on P |C\C∗ . Hence, it outputs
C∗ ∪W ′, where W ′ is a committee output by Phragme´n’s sequential rule for P |C\C∗ . By the
inductive hypothesis, W ′ is a laminar proportional output for (P |C\C∗ , k − r), and Phragme´n’s
sequential rule terminates after time (k − r)/n. Thus, C∗ ∪W ′ is a laminar proportional output
for (P, k), and is obtained after time r/n+ (k − r)/n = k/n.
(iii) Suppose (P1, k1) and (P2, k2) are disjoint laminar instances with P = P1 + P2, k =
k1 + k2 and such that n/k = n1/k1 = n2/k2. Run Phragme´n’s sequential rule on P until
time k/n. Since the subprofiles P1 and P2 are disjoint (different voters and different candidates),
the set of candidates W elected until this time point is exactly the union of candidates elected
by Phragme´n’s rule run on the two profiles separately. Let W1 be the candidates elected for P1,
and W2 those for P2. By the inductive hypothesis, for j = 1, 2, we have |Wj | = kj because the
rule terminates in time kj/nj = k/n, and Wj is laminar proportional. Hence, W = W1 ∪W2 is
laminar proportional, and Phragme´n’s sequential rule at time k/n.
The proof establishes that on any laminar instance, Phragme´n’s sequential rule terminates in
time k/n.
(b) We prove that Rule X is laminar proportional by induction on k. Let (P, k) be a laminar
instance. (i) If P is unanimous, then the rule is obviously laminar proportional on (P, k). (ii) After
electing a unanimously approved candidate, each voter’s budget is reduced to 1− 1k . According to
the definition of Rule X, if a coalition V of voters wishes to buy a candidate, this costs each voter
n/(k|V |). Now change currency by multiplying all remaining budgets and purchase costs by the
factor k/(k − 1). Then each voter’s budget is 1, and buying a candidate costs n/(k − 1). Thus,
we can see that from now on Rule X proceeds as if it was run on the instance (P−c, k − 1). (iii)
Suppose (P1, k1) and (P2, k2) are disjoint laminar instances with P = P1 + P2, k = k1 + k2 and
such that n/k = n1/k1 = n2/k2. Then it is clear that Rule X, run on (P, k), proceeds exactly as
if run in parallel on the instances (P1, k1) and (P2, k2), since by n/k = n1/k1 = n2/k2 the prices
in all three instances are the same.
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(c) In Example 4, the committee {c1, c2, c3, c4} is one of the optimal committees under PAV,
but it is not a laminar proportional committee. Refer to the introduction for another instance
with a unique PAV committee that fails laminar proportionality.
Theorem 7. Rule X satisfies the O (log k)-core property, but fails the O (logc k)-core property for
each c < 1.
Proof. Upper bound. Let us fix α = 12 log(2k) . Let A be an approval based profile and let W
be a committee returned by Rule X for A. Recall that p = n/k is the price that Rule X uses to
construct W . Further, assume that there exists a group of voters S ⊆ N and a set of candidates
T such that:
1. |T | 6 k · |S|n , and
2. 14 log(2k)+1 · |Ai ∩ T | > max(|Ai ∩W |, 1) for each i ∈ S.
Thus, the groups S and T witness that Rule X does not satisfy 14 log(2k)+1 -core property. We
will derive a contradiction from this assumption, which is sufficient to prove the theorem. First,
observe that since 14 log(2k)+1 =
α
α+2 the second condition implies that for each i ∈ S:
α · (|Ai ∩ T | − |Ai ∩W |) > 2|Av ∩W |. (5)
Further, if |Ai ∩W | = 0, then 14 log(2k)+1 · |Ai ∩ T | > 1 implies that α ·
(|Ai ∩ T | − |Ai ∩W |) > 1.
In any case, we can reformulate (5) as:
α · (|Ai ∩ T | − |Ai ∩W |) > |Ai ∩W |+ 1. (6)
Now, consider a fixed subset S′ ⊆ S, and let
sS′ =
∑
i∈S′
(|Ai ∩ T | − |Ai ∩W |).
Consider all time moments during the execution of Rule X for profile A which satisfy the
following condition: each voter from S′ has at least p · |T |sS′ dollars left (the choice of this value will
become clear later on). From the pigeonhole principle, during the whole execution of Rule X—in
particular, in the time moments that we consider—there exists a not-yet selected candidate who
is approved by at least sS′/|T | voters from S′. Thus, during the considered time moments the
amount that a single voter needs to pay for a representative is no greater than:
p · |T |
sS′
Further, since in all the considered time moments the voters from S′ have enough money to buy
an additional candidate, the procedure of assembling the committee cannot stop. Thus, there
must exists a moment when some voter from S′, call it i, is left with less than p · |T |sS′ dollars.
Let t be the first such a moment. As we observed, before t each voter from S′ pays at most
p · |T |sS′ for each representative. Thus, at time t voter i has more than the following number of
representatives:
ri =
1− p · |T |sS′
p · |T |sS′
=
sS′
p|T | − 1.
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By (6) we have that:
|Ai ∩ T | − |Ai ∩W | > |Ai ∩W |+ 1
α
>
ri + 1
α
=
sS′
p|T |α
Let S′′ = S′ \ {i}. Clearly, we have that:
sS′′ = sS′ − (|Ai ∩ T | − |Ai ∩W |) 6 sS′
(
1− 1
p|T |α
)
.
The above reasoning holds for each S′ ⊆ S. Thus, we start with S′ = S and apply it recursively,
in each iteration decreasing the size of S′ by 1. After |S|/2 iterations we are left with a subset Se
such that:
sSe 6 sS
(
1− 1
p|T |α
) |S|
2
6 sS
(
1− 1
p|T |α
)n|T |
2k
= sS
(
1− 1
p|T |α
) p|T |
2
< sS
(
1
e
) 1
2α
.
Since sSe > |S|/2 (for each i ∈ S it must hold that Ai ∩ T 6= ∅) and sS 6 |S| · |T | we get that:
|S|
2
· e 12α < |S| · |T |,
which is equivalent to e
1
2α < 2|T | and, further, to α > 12 log(2|T |) > 12 log(2k) . This gives a contra-
diction and completes the proof for the upper bound.
Lower bound. Fix c < 1. We will construct a preference profile for which Rule X returns a
committee that violates the core property up to a multiplicative ratio of the order of O
(
1
logc(k)
)
.
In the construction we will use an intuitively large constant value L, which we do not specify yet,
but which will become clear later on. Further, we do not specify the committee size k nor the
number of voters n yet, but we fix their ratio to nk = L. Thus, intuitively, a group of L voters will
have exactly enough money to pay for a single representative in the winning committee. Finally,
the construction is parameterized with a constant x; the committee size will be selected so that
x = O(log(k)).
First, we introduce x groups of voters, S1, . . . , Sx, and the set R of x
x candidates. The groups
S1, . . . , Sx are equal-sized: |Si| = L · xx−1 for each i ∈ [x]. Each voter from group Si approves
exactly xi candidates from R; further, the approval sets are constructed so that within each
group Si each candidate from R is approved by the same number of voters. Such a construction
is possible if L is sufficiently large. Observe that in the so far construction, each candidate from
R is approved by the following number of voters:
sx =
∑x
i=1 |Si| · xi
xx
=
L
x
·
x∑
i=1
·xi = L(x
x − 1)
x− 1 .
In particular, observe that sx > |Si|. Now, we introduce sxL additional candidates who are all
approved by the same set of sx voters—call the set of these candidates R1; the voters who approve
R1 are those from Sx and sx − |Si| new voters, not belonging to S = S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sx. The idea is
that Rule X run with price p = n/k first selects the candidates from R1. Since
n
k = L, after the
candidates from R1 are selected all the voters from Sx will have no money left.
We will construct the remaining part of the profile inductively. Assume that after some first
steps of the execution of Rule X the voters from groups Sℓ+1, Sℓ+2, . . . , Sx are left without money,
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for some ℓ ∈ {1, . . . x − 1}. The number of approvals that each candidate from R gets from the
voters from S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sℓ is equal to:
sℓ =
∑ℓ
i=1 |Si| · xi
xx
=
L
x
·
ℓ∑
i=1
·xi = L(x
ℓ − 1)
x− 1 .
Observe that for ℓ < x we have that sℓ < |Si|. Now we introduce additional candidates to our
construction as follows. First, we take some sℓ voters from Sℓ and introduce
sℓ
L candidates who
are approved by these voters. Rule X will select these candidates in the next step and leave
these sℓ voters without money. We remove these sℓ voters from Sℓ and we repeat the procedure
until in Sℓ there are less than sℓ voters. When in Sℓ there are rℓ < sℓ voters with money, then
we proceed as follows. We add sℓ − rℓ new voters and make these new voters and those which
were left from Sℓ approve some
sℓ
L new candidates. Rule X will select these candidates and will
eventually leave all voters from Sℓ without money. Thus, the inductive step can be repeated until
no voter from S = S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sx has money left.
Now, observe that each voter from Sℓ got exactly
sℓ
L representatives. At the same time, the
voters from S could afford to buy candidates from R, where each voter from Sℓ would get exactly
xℓ candidates. Thus, the committee returned by Rule X approximates the core property by no
better than:
xℓ
sℓ
L
=
xℓ
xℓ−1
x−1
=
xℓ+1 − xℓ
xℓ − 1 > x− 1.
Now it remains to show that in our construction x is in the order of log(k). For that we first
assess the number of voters n. Observe that during our interactive procedure, for each ℓ < x we
have added a set of voters that is smaller than Sℓ. To Sx we added sx − |Si| voters. Thus, in
total n can be upper bounded by:
n < 2|S| + sx = 2Lxx + L(x
x − 1)
x− 1
Consequently, since L = nk we have that:
k < 2xx +
(xx − 1)
x− 1 < 3x
x = 3 · 2x log(x).
For sufficiently large x we have that k < 2x
1/c
, which implies that x1/c > log(k), and so that
x > logc(k). This completes the proof.
Proposition 4. Rule X violates the core subject to Pprice, where ((P, k),W ′) ∈ Pprice if W ′ is
priceable.
Proof. Consider the following profile. There are 160 voters divided into 3 groups, V1, V2 and
V3, with |V1| = |V2| = 56, and |V3| = 48. There are two groups of candidate, C1 and C2, with
|C1| = 20, and |C2| = 16. We set k = 20, thus n/k = 8.
First, let us describe how we construct voters’ preferences over the first group of candidates
C1 = {c1, . . . , c20}. Voters from V1 approve c1, . . . , c7; voters from V2 approve c8, . . . , c14; finally
we divide V3 into 6 equal-size groups (the size of each such group is 8), and we let each such group
approve one of the remaining 6 candidates from C1. Intuitively, C1 will be the outcome of Rule
X for the constructed preference profile.
Next, let us describe the preferences over the second group of candidates C2. We start by
dividing C2 into two equal-size subgroups, C2a and C2b, with |C2a| = |C2b| = 8. From V1 we pick
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a subset V ′1 of 40 voters and let the voters from V
′
1 approve all candidates from C2a. Analogously,
from V2 we select a subset V
′
2 of 40 voters and let these approve all candidates from C2b. Finally,
we divide the voters from V3 into 8 equal-size groups (each of size 6) and let each group approve
one candidate from C2a and one candidate from C2b (different candidates for different groups).
This completes the construction.
Indeed, it is easy to verify that for this profile Rule X will pick C1. On the other hand, C2 is a
priceable deviation for the voters from V ′ = V 1′ ∪V ′2 ∪V3. To see that, first note that |V ′| = 128,
and that |V ′|/|V | · k = 16 = |C2|. Further, in C2 each voter from V ′1 and from V ′2 would have 8
representatives (in C1, they would have only 7). Each voter from V3 will have 2 representatives
in C2 (while in C1 they would have only one). Finally, it is easy to verify that C2 is priceable
with the price equal 8. For example, for each candidate from C2a each voter from V
′
1 pays 1/8 and
the voters from the respective subgroup of V3 pay 1/2. Thus, each candidate gets:
1
8
· 40 + 6 · 1
2
= 5 + 3 = 8.
This completes the proof.
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